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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses the current financial crisis from a Neo-Schumpeterian perspective. We 
postulate four linkages that led to the crisis, and that will help us find our way out of the cri-
sis. Therefore, we show that the current evolution is very similar to the Japanese crisis in the 
beginning of the 1990s. Furthermore, we address the issue why the world was faced with this 
crisis in such an unprepared way and look at the deficiencies in current economic theories that 
are responsible for the fact that we did not foresee this development. Besides, we elaborate 
that the crisis is not a systemic default of the capitalistic system but that it is rather a conse-
quence of its enormous success. Finally, we propose the Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor as a 
theoretical framework that can help avoid such dramatic evolutions as the current crisis and 
look at possibilities to overcome this situation. 
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Introduction 
Most of the currently active economists see in the World Economic Crisis at the end of the 
1920s a textbook example of economic decline. It is also a widely analyzed research topic, 
used as an empirical basis of many business cycle models. Hardly anyone ever really thought 
that the financial markets of the world could once again fall into such a crisis and that eco-
nomic theories would be confronted with a situation as drastic as the one we are experiencing 
right now.1 The economic fluctuations of the last 60 years have been judged more or less to be 
necessary processes of cleansing, which could in no way endanger the enormous success of 
the free market economy in the western industrialized countries. On the contrary, all those 
politicians and intellectuals who were hoping for a collapse of the capitalistic system instead 
witnessed the downfall of the state regulated and centrally administered economies in Eastern 
Europe, a downfall followed by an unseen and hardly thought possible increase in social well-
being after the introduction of the market economy. 
So what are the developments of the last few years which have led the world close to a mood 
of doom and have made people think more intensively than ever before on how to deal with 
the plight that is showing on the horizon? Is it the scientists, the politicians, and the media 
who have failed to point out in a timely and urgent manner the dangers or even the possibility 
of a crash of the capitalistic system? Why did systemic control mechanisms not strike a bell 
and warn us that the modern way of living, working, consuming and investing would not only 
have ecological but to a high degree also financial consequences? 
This paper will try to answer those questions by proposing four postulates. We aim not only at 
explaining the causes that led to the crisis but also at showing which lessons can be drawn 
                                                 
1 There is a critical overview on the state of economics as a science about 20 years ago as well as an outlook on 
the future developments in Hanusch and Recktenwald (1992) and in Hanusch (1992).  
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from the experiences of the immediate past. Our analysis is based to a large degree on find-
ings which stem from the Neo-Schumpeterian approach. The first postulate highlights the 
parallel evolution of today’s crisis with the one that Japan suffered during the 1990s. The 
second hypothesis deals with the deficiencies in the currently dominant (neo-) classical eco-
nomic school and tries to examine whether it possibly shares some of the responsibility for 
the present situation. The third postulate concentrates on a phenomenon which seems to be 
particularly linked to the capitalistic system. We will talk about the dynamic forces which 
will, on the one hand, lead the system to almost infinite success and, on the other hand, as a 
consequence, may lead to unexpected crashes. The fourth hypothesis will propose a frame-
work of goals and actions designed as a means of support to be better prepared for such global 
crises in the future. 
 
 
In Japanese footprints 
Postulate: Today’s world financial crisis evolves in similar fashion to the crisis that Ja-
pan suffered about 20 years ago. 
The Japanese economic miracle happened at the same time as the German “Wirtschaftswund-
er” and marked a period of enormous growth in production. Between 1954 and 1973, the Jap-
anese economy increased tenfold2 and, by 1976, Japan had risen to be the second largest 
economy of the world, trumped only by the USA. Three characteristics specific to Japan’s 
situation had made this prodigious development possible: the enlargment of private 
investment facilitated by the large savings of  households; the marked change from an 
agricultural to an industrial society, which was spurred by the availability of high-skilled 
labor; and the increase in productivity which came about from the successful replication and 
enhancement of foreign technologies.3 Japanese growth peaked in the early 1970s. For the 
first time since the end of the Second World War, the country encountered a negative growth 
in 1974, and it focused towards the end of the decade on shaping its industrial configuration 
to be more energy-saving, since the high import-dependency concerning energy could lead to 
difficulties. 
                                                 
2 cf. Johnson (1982). 
3 cf. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (2008a). 
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Between 1979 and 1983, growth slowed considerably. Nevertheless, Japan remained a 
country with remarkable gains in productivity, and in the late 1980s, it had the highest per-
capita income among the larger countries of the world.4 
From the beginning of the 1990s, the country suffered an unprecendented crisis in the 
financial markets, which led Japan into a more than 10-year stagnation. The main reason for 
the economic slump was the hard landing at the end of the tremendously successful 
development of its economy. The evolution of the crisis was as follows: During the 80s, Japan 
saw a strong rise in prices of financial and fixed assets, followed by an overheated economic 
environment. This was nourished by large amounts of capital available at low interest rates, 
which led to an increase in the money supply.5 
Another factor responsible for the bubble in the financial and housing sectors was the so 
called “Plaza Agreement” which bound the G5 countries in September 1985 to devalue the 
US-Dollar vis-à-vis the other four currencies. The decision was based on pressure by the 
USA, where the worsening terms of trade stemming from a strong dollar had led to falling 
prices on imported goods and a rising trade balance deficit. The so-caused upvaluation of the 
yen and the strong decline in Japanese exports forced the country to a change of strategy. 
According to the “Maekawa-Report” of April 1986, the economy should rely much more on 
domestic demand. Consequently, the Japanese central bank lowered the interest rates 
dramatically, in order to stimulate domestic investment. 
A further key reason was the “Louvre-Accord” of February 1987, where the G6 countries 
agreed to end the depreciation of the dollar, which had followed the “Plaza-Agreement” to 
stabilize exchange rates. Practically, this required Japan to reduce the discount rate to 2.5 per-
cent in order to increase the money supply and to depreciate the yen.6 The Japanese central 
bank offered money in almost unlimited amounts during that period. As a result, M2 rose 
from 285 trillion yen at the beginning of 1985 to more than 500 trillion yen at the end of 
1990.7  
Loans were accordingly available at relatively low interest rates. Many companies used this 
opportunity to take out mortgages on their properties, which they used to buy new real proper-
ty, requesting mortgages for the new properties as well. This was possible because the real 
estate prices and consequently the accounting values were soaring due to the increased de-
                                                 
4 In 1989, only Switzerland, Luxemburg and Bermuda had higher per-capita incomes. Cf. NationMaster.com 
(2008). 
5 cf. Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka (2001) 
6 cf. Bank of Japan (2008). 
7 cf. Bank of Japan (2008). 
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mand. The already high Japanese real estate prices grew to astronomical heights. At the peak 
of the speculative bubble in 1989, the gardens of the emperor’s palace were worth more than 
all of Canada. A 1200 square meter premise in central Tokyo was worth almost 850 million 
US-dollars.8 
The high liquidity of Japanese companies also led to high investments in other sectors such as 
stocks or foreign investments. Especially in the USA, many companies were consequently 
taken over by their Japanese competitors. Driven by those investments, the Japanese economy 
grew at an enormous rate.9 Between 1987 and 1990, Japanese GDP grew on average by 5 
percent per year.10 
Finally, this speculative development, which had by then been completely decoupled from 
real productivity growth, led to a dramatic crash. The Japanese central bank was forced to act 
as a result of the booming economy and the rapid price increase in the stock and the real es-
tate markets. For fear of high inflation, it raised the discount rate from that which had pre-
vailed in 1989 in just more than one year from 2.5 to 6.0 percent, in order to reduce the mon-
ey supply.11 Consequently, new credit became much more expensive and often people could 
no longer pay maturing liabilities. Since the invested money had gone mostly into items of 
speculative value, many companies offered their holdings for immediate sale when confronted 
with the new reality. Due to the excessive supply, property prices plunged dramatically so 
that, by 2002, Japan reached the price level of the late 70s.12 The Nikkei-index at the stock 
market showed a similar development.13 
The outmost lax monetary policy of the Japanese central bank is certainly a valid argument 
for explaining the development of the speculative bubble in their stock and real estate mar-
kets. Nevertheless, we have to raise the question, whether this development was inevitable. 
Was it not the responsibility of the political sphere to intervene in time and to stop and pre-
vent this development from unfolding? 
It was definitely a large mistake that the Bank of Japan used the interest rate as a political 
measure too half-heartedly at first and then too exuberantly. On the one hand, it has waited 
too long to raise the discount rate and then, on the other hand, acted too hectically and exces-
sively. If this decisive mistake had not occurred, the burst of the bubble could have been 
avoided or at least weakened in its effects. Further defects of the Japanese policies may have 
                                                 
8 cf. for example Becker (1989). 
9 cf. Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka (2001). 
10 cf. Department of National Accounts, ESRI (2008). 
11 cf. Bank of Japan (2008). 
12 cf. Baader (2005). 
13 cf. for example Bigsten (2004) and Bank of Japan (2008). 
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been the too moderate regulations for credits as well as the missing limitation of loans in the 
housing industry.14 
Needless to say, we should also ask if the burst of the speculative bubble in the real estate 
sector was the only trigger and the only amplifier for the economic tumble of the country in 
the 90s. Other factors, such as the weak world economy, did certainly play a role for the ex-
port nation Japan at that time. Nevertheless, many economists share the firm belief that the 
Japanese economy could have found itself resurrected after a few years if it had implemented 
a different monetary policy.15 
In any case, Japan has experienced a more than ten year long recession following the burst of 
the “bubble economy”. In the 1980s, the country achieved an average growth per year of its 
GDP of 4.1 percent which was considerably more than similarly highly developed industria-
lized countries. But between 1991 and 2000, the average growth rate of GDP dropped to only 
1.4 percent per year. This left Japan among the weakest performing countries in the interna-
tional growth ranking.16 
The sudden decline in stock and real estate prices substantially impaired many companies. 
The commercial banks held many so called “foul credits”, which surmounted by far the value 
of the underlying property and buildings. The debtors, who were mostly Japanese companies, 
often did not have the financial leeway to defray the interest payments, let alone repay the 
loans themselves. This led to a wave of insolvencies, which tore down other companies. The 
amount of irrecoverable credit amounted at the end of the 90s to an estimated 200 trillion yen, 
which corresponds to about 2 trillion euros.17 Only governmental intervention could have 
saved the Japanese financial system from collapse. Consequently, the larger mortgage banks 
received about 500 billion euros in public money.18 A similar development followed for the 
indebted companies. The amount of insolvencies grew from 6,500 in 1990 to almost 20.00019 
in 1998. 
The wave of disappearances of firms had to induce major changes in the labor market. For 
decades, Japan almost reached full employment. From 1991, the unemployment rate grew 
continuously from about 2 percent to its historic peak of 5.4 percent in 2002.20 Two develop-
                                                 
14 cf. Saxonhouse and Stern (2004). 
15 cf. Saxonhouse and Stern (2004). 
16 cf. Weinert (2001). 
17 cf. AFP (2007). 
18 cf. Baader (2005). 
19 The explanatory power of this figure is debatable, since there is often a lagged development due to delayed 
insolvency proceedings. Cf. Kageyama and Harada (2005). 
20 Data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (2008b). The rate is still very low in an interna-
tional comparison due to the specialties of the Japanese labor market, such as a lifelong relationship between 
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ments were striking in this situation: the accrual in the number of unemployed young adults 
and the reduction in the number of fulltime employees, together with a significant surge in 
part-time and short-term labor contracts. Furthermore, the government limited the amount of 
working-days as well as the amount of working-hours per week in 1992 in order to help create 
new jobs.21 
In the early 1990s, Japan found itself at the beginning of a period of deflation, which was due 
to many factors. On the one hand, the banks largely restricted their lending after the burst of 
the speculative bubble; on the other hand, the Japanese customers disposed of less income and 
decided to save a higher percentage of this reduced income. Both developments contracted the 
money supply and aggregate demand. The reluctance to consume led to an under-utilization 
of production capacities and, therefore, to an increasing difference between potential and real 
GDP. This pattern continued from 1991 until 2005, pointing to the constant overproduction 
which had to generate a decrease in prices.22 
So we cannot qualify the current financial crisis as a surprising and unpredictable event, when 
looking at the development in Japan. The Japanese crisis had similar causes and a comparable 
evolution to the current one, even though its dimensions did not have such a global effect. 
This is due to the fact that globalization, which is the worldwide interconnection of econo-
mies, had not yet been as strong as it is today, and to the fact that the USA, as the largest and 
most important economy in the world, had only been touched peripherally and did not play a 
central role or act as an amplifier. 
Those factors may also have been responsible for the fact that both economics as well as 
global politics and the media coverage did not take the resulting shocks seriously and only 
treated them superficially. This leads to our second postulate. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
employer and employee, large governmental employment programs etc.  Nevertheless, when including the esti-
mated number of unreported cases, the unemployment rate is suspected to be three times as large because of the 
optimistic calculations. Cf. Demes (1998). 
21 cf. Hayashi and Prescott (2001). 
22 cf. EconStats (2005) and Saxonhouse (2005). 
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We used the wrong glasses 
Postulate: The common, Anglo-Saxon theory of economics is not capable of establishing 
a convincing systematic cause-effect-framework for the above described processes in the 
case of Japan or the current global financial crisis which would put it into the position of 
analyzing and explaining those developments both adequately and in a satisfying way. 
We have to raise the question, why the economic “mainstream” has so much difficulty in de-
ciphering a cyclical development process such as the above mentioned. Why does it fail in the 
quest for its underlying reasons, in the recognition of its true characteristics, and in a deduced 
proposition of the most effective measures against a looming economic crisis? A central point 
may be found in the predominant opinion found for decades in research and teaching that 
economics is first and foremost a discipline which has as its main interest the free and flexible 
adjustment of supply and demand. Intellectually, this may result from the fictional creation of 
the “homo oeconomicus”, the imagined rational economic agent who is able to accomplish an 
efficient and balanced allocation of goods, services, wealth, and other resources on all mar-
kets by using the price principle and through the interaction with other economic actors.23  
In other scientific disciplines, and especially in the natural sciences, the mainstream has suc-
cessfully grown out of those rather mechanistic explanatory patterns. Even in physics, where 
mechanics – a field where many substances gravitate towards an equilibrium state – has al-
ways played a major role, we find an established research on phenomena dealing with com-
plex and chaotic processes. They cannot be characterized by the drive towards equilibrium but 
are rather linked by their unbalanced and often erratic dynamics.24 Research on climate devel-
opment, human genes, or large fields of modern biotechnologies has its fundamental roots in 
ideas that have a very qualitatively complex background restricting them from being analyzed 
through simple quantitative methods. The mainstream in economics, on the other hand, still 
derives its theories in large part from equilibrium models, which allow a mathematical, for-
mal, and logically consistent systematization and analysis. A central criticism is that it lacks a 
sufficient comprehension of qualitative inputs of economic life, which are influential and em-
pirically verifiable in technical processes and developments or in psychological phenomena. 
Above all, the mainstream does not show a future orientation but tries to find solutions in the 
                                                 
23 An early but in many respects still very relevant critique of the neoclassical theory can be found in Georgescu-
Roegen (1981). There is also a very harsh critique of the assumption of rationality by economists who favor the 
school of behavioral economics. See Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
24 cf. Prigogine (2005). 
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present, thus raising the principle of static, allocative efficiency above all other possible strat-
egies of accrual of wealth in economy as well as in society.25 
In order fully to understand and model the capitalistic system, we have to include other forces 
and factors into our analysis such as the risk-taking entrepreneur, who acts on the basis of 
innovation and future oriented strategies in his enterprise and in markets.26 The willingness to 
take risks is therefore just as necessary for the creation and implementation of new goods and 
services in markets as are capabilities and creativity. Thus defined, capitalism becomes a sys-
tem which is to a high degree linked to uncertainty and insecurity both in a positive and nega-
tive sense. Basically, everything can and will happen if the system is allowed to develop free-
ly. It is capable of generating the most impressive performances and also of causing most 
painful collapses. It is, therefore, not a system of balance and harmony, but one which flutters 
between possible extremes of the highest success and the most deplorable decay. This is true 
for companies as well as regions, nations and global economic areas. This quandary between 
forces that gravitate towards equilibrium and those that always force the system into a newly 
unbalanced state can be regarded as an almost constitutional phenomenon as well as a funda-
mental problem for a modern society that relies on progress both in knowledge and technolo-
gy. Schumpeter referred to this situation with the ingeniously accurate phrase of “creative 
destruction”27. 
In economics, there really is only one school of thought which tackles the reality and expe-
riences of capitalistic systems by applying such a strategy. It is the field of Evolutionary Eco-
nomics. The heterodox orientation of this economic current shows in representatives such as 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Friedrich August von Hayek, Thorstein Veblen and, last but not 
least, Joseph A. Schumpeter, all of them being substantial precursors to this school of thought. 
Contrary to the neoclassical paradigm, which hardly ever deflects from the assumption of 
reversibility of the standard model and which fundamentally presupposes the gravitation to-
wards equilibrium, evolutionary economists explicitly account for irreversibility and so called 
far-from-equilibrium states in their models.28 Only then can we attain a level of explanation 
which is close enough to reality to allow for a substantial analysis of crises and changes. Fur-
thermore, these economists deviate from the ideal model of the homo oeconomicus by lifting 
the assumed homogeneity of mainstream agents and by including heterogeneous actors. The 
admittance of differentiated actors and the processes of variation and selection of economic 
                                                 
25 For a thorough normative critique that elaborates in a well-founded way on this argument, cf. Sen (1985). 
26 Cf. exemplarily Kirzner (1997). 
27 cf. Schumpeter (1975). 
28 cf. Haken (2005) and Witt (1992). 
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actions linked to them is a necessary condition for the development of true innovations, and 
their analytical separation in its full breadth and depth as well as their use in corresponding 
models as endogenous factors make an analysis and an explanation of long-term develop-
ments possible.29 Ultimately, the creative entrepreneur who will have to deal with true uncer-
tainty plays a central role in the development of innovations which are so essential in evolu-
tionary economics. 
Maybe it is due to the complexity of the evolutionary approach that the neoclassical is still the 
dominant school in economic theory, even though this school of thought apparently suffers 
from very narrow boundaries when it comes to analyzing and explaining phenomena of crises. 
In any case, we also have to ascertain a neoclassical predominance in the central banks and 
the philosophy they follow as well as the instruments they are using. Instead of focusing on a 
neoliberal, short-term policy of fighting inflation in the consumers’ market basket of goods 
and services, the central banks should have addressed earlier, both in the case of Japan and in 
the run-up to the current financial crisis, the long-term inflation in assets that was developing 
in the stock and real estate markets as well as their underlying causes, for it is the inflation in 
assets itself which is in an evolutionary-Schumpeterian context a cause for distortion and cris-
es. 
In this theoretical framework, crises are not considered to be exogenous shocks that happen to 
arise without any real influence of the market participants, as the neoclassical business cycle 
and growth theory assumes. They rather occur as endogenous phenomena and can therefore 
be anticipated much better and be integrated into an economic and political framework. The 
momentous challenge for an evolutionary economic policy then lies in discouraging an exces-
sive flow of liquidity into investments and markets, which only foster asset creation in a stat-
ic, allocative sense, and in promoting the flow into investments and markets which will in-
crease the long-term development prospects of an economy.30   
From this perspective, we juxtapose allocative efficiency, which is elevated by the neoclassic-
al theory, and a so called evolutionary efficiency, which relates to a successful constitution of 
sustainable capabilities for future development in companies, markets and economies.31 
Schumpeter already recognized this trade-off between allocative and evolutionary efficiency 
and explained it as follows: “A system – any system, economic or other – that at every point 
in time fully utilizes its possibilities to its best advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to 
                                                 
29 As a corresponding evolutionary standard textbook, we refer to Nelson and Winter (1982). 
30 cf. Hanusch and Pyka (2007c) or Wegner (2004) 
31 cf. Potts (2000) and Erdmann (1993). 
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a system that does so at no given point in time, because the latter’s failure to do so may be a 
condition for a level or speed of long-run performance.”32 
Our third postulate follows closely from this idea. 
 
It’s not a bug 
Postulate: Crises as we experienced them in the 1920s and afterwards on a regional level 
as well as now once again globally do not result from failures in the market economy or 
the capitalistic system. They are not systemic defaults but are much rather the result 
and product of an excessive and exaggerated success of this system. 
This can be shown by analyzing the development of the last 20 years in the USA, and as we 
explained earlier, this evolution is analogous to the one in Japan in the 70s and 80s. The true 
base of today’s global financial crisis lies in the USA and in the enormous economic boom, 
which was spurred by the coincidence of several economic factors that may be called Schum-
peterian: the innovative base technology in the IT-sector which spread like wildfire; the rea-
diness of creative entrepreneurs; and last, the availability of sufficient risk capital that could 
be used to finance a future oriented expansion. Besides, the government provided the neces-
sary framework by choosing a policy of low taxes and deregulation of economic processes. 
This expansion period proved to be so tremendously successful that it burst – not only in the 
IT-sector – all scales of evaluation of companies and it carried with it many other economic 
sectors to unseen heights.  
Around the year 2000, the boom stumbled over its own hubris, its own contemptuousness, its 
own exorbitance and the limitless optimism of the involved actors. The eventual burst of the 
inflated bubble preceded the deep slump of the New Economy and the Dot-Net-World. 
All the important stock indexes of the global financial world shrunk in the aftermath to about 
one third of their formerly reached highs. The political sphere, especially the central banks, 
had no other option but to react almost in panic by lowering interest rates and therefore by 
adding even more new liquidity. Since the formerly lucrative fields in the business world had 
vanished, investors searched for new fields with satisfying returns. They found their new El-
dorado in the real estate sector. This is the point where we find the shift from the firm sector 
to the households and consumers. Once again, it was the substantial short-term success that 
led investors to be excessively optimistic. This optimism was additionally animated by inno-
vative, supposedly risk-free financial products which were custom made for the US real estate 
                                                 
32 Schumpeter (1975). 
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sector. The consequence was an immense speculative bubble which was no longer located in 
the firms sector but in the consumers and household sectors. The US homeowners had the 
impression that they were growing ever richer with increasing prices for their houses and they 
adapted their spending and saving behavior to this perceived wealth. They were willing to pile 
up an ever larger debt and to use the loans to a large degree for personal consumption.  
In this situation, the Federal Reserve, the US central bank, feared nothing more than growing 
inflation. In order to counter this tendency, it began in 2004 to increase the interest rate. Many 
homeowners could not afford the additional financial burdens. More and more lenders 
showed deficits in payment which allowed a peek at the true situation in the real estate market 
and also aroused the suspicion of risks that might be integrated in the credit based, “innova-
tive” financial products. Since the entire banking sector worldwide had started to believe in 
the easily achievable, above average return of those products and had started to buy them in 
large quantities, the increasing deficits in payment hit not only US banks but also shook glob-
al financial institutions in a more or less drastic way.33 This produced a worldwide crisis of 
trust, liquidity shortages and, as a consequence, insolvencies and closures in the banking sec-
tor, especially in the field of investment banking. 
All struggles of the central banks to add liquidity to the economy have so far hardly proven to 
be successful. We are still in the middle of a global financial crisis which risks spreading into 
a world economic crisis. In all concerned countries and economies, the call is out for the gov-
ernment and the political sectors to intervene as the knight in shining armor. Once again, it is 
the overwhelming, short-term success which pushes even such a proud economy as the USA 
and many other countries in its wake into the crisis and elevates the government as a potent 
player, conscious of its own power, back on the stage of economic everyday life. Following 
this finding, we add our fourth postulate. 
 
  
                                                 
33 See for example Welfens (2008). 
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The eo-Schumpeterian Corridor 
Postulate: The task of the government in a mixed democratic economic system is to try 
to fit the economic policy into a holistic view of economic development in which the fu-
ture oriented, dynamic co-evolution of the real and the financial sectors play a dominant 
role. Furthermore, the government should restrict itself to smoothing an erratic growth 
path and should not engage unilaterally and partially as an individual economic actor 
with short-term interests in the market with measures such as nationalization or go-
vernmental control of the financial sector.
34
  
Due to the neoliberal, neoclassical state of mind of the important makers and shakers in aca-
demia and politics, who consider the government to be a sort of repair garage of last resort, 
the people in charge are skating on thin ice and risk overreacting. They think that they have 
recognized some defaults in the market system and are trying to eliminate them by strong 
public involvement. Apparently, this provides the government with a role and responsibility 
that exceeds by far every so far accepted dimension. The currently discussed inventory of 
possible measures represents exhaustively the whole spectrum of public activity: intervention, 
regulation, control, and nationalization are the most frequently cited terms when it comes to 
using governmental help to cope with both the financial crisis and the developing economic 
crisis. This can be an extremely risky attitude, especially when it leads to a policy of partial 
“piecemeal engineering” and when the overall context that characterizes modern economies in 
the era of the knowledge societies is not respected. 
It does not seem controversial that successful capitalistic economies cannot exist without a 
certain amount of regulation if we want them to generate an economic development which is 
sustainable and less erratic than the unregulated invisible hand could achieve. The govern-
ment as a political actor can, and should, of course, make a contribution so that ups and 
downs in the development process of an economy are more moderate and steady and that a 
smoother evolution can be attained. In this context, we propose a concept as an analytical 
framework which we have introduced earlier as the “Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor”.35 
 
                                                 
34 For a country such as China, where the market economy is firmly linked to the authoritarian system of a single 
party, we would most likely have to modify this assumption. For that kind of capitalism, the question of appro-
priateness and flexibility as well as the degree of efficiency of political measures appears to be fairly unknown. 
See for example Elegant (2008). 
35 cf. Hanusch and Pyka (2007b). 
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The same is true for the case of an economy that is too successful and attains growth rates far 
above average, rates which may be neither sustained nor stabilized. This success may very 
well create the positive and optimistic basic attitude in the economic agents necessary for fu-
ture-oriented operations, but rapid growth is always linked to an accelerated process of 
change in the structures of an economy. There are sectors which are readily expanding and 
others that do not grow as dynamically and so cannot keep up with the fast pace of develop-
ment pushed upon them by the fast growing domains. The real development in such an eco-
nomic system will then be determined by two velocities. The variables that impose and can 
bear the high speed will be found in the innovative and strongly growing sectors and compa-
nies, while the sluggish variables fall into the sectors of low growth. As long as the latter 
serve as a natural brake for an exuberant economic dynamics, the economy will continue to 
position itself within the corridor and quite possibly even at its upper boundary. From a theo-
retical point of view, this is the best and economically the most successful situation for an 
economy.38 Admittedly, this case will empirically only occur in the rarest cases for a longer 
period of time. 
For the structural conflict between the fast and the slowly developing industries in an econo-
my can – even if it was limited to the real sector and therefore seems to follow the Schumpe-
terian ideal of “creative destruction” – lead to the complete breakdown of the entire system, 
because the inert sectors can no longer support the high pace of growth of the dynamic indus-
tries. This may happen when, for example, the infrastructure, the training of employees, or the 
adaptation to customers’ wants or suppliers’ conditions cannot be altered and harmonized 
rapidly enough and will then work as a scotch block for all sectors. 
Still, this case may also be seen as an exception, just as the “natural” adjustment of dynamic 
and retarding forces in an economy or an economic region. Empirical findings and the history 
of economics show that, in general, two spheres of action are responsible for the determina-
tion of the state and the position – within the corridor, the overheating or the stagnating zone 
– of an economic body. The causal factors are in the real sector on the first part and to a large 
degree in the financial sector of an economy on the second part. 
The dynamic industry or industries such as the IT-sector in the 90s will incite the attention 
and the interest of all those economic actors who will want to participate in the boom in fast 
growing domains as financial investors and who will want to also enjoy the high returns  
achievable. The technology driven expansion in the dynamic part of the industrial sector will 
                                                 
38 cf. Saviotti and Pyka (2008): This is based on the idea that there are forces in an economy that tend by them-
selves towards the best solutions following the principle of self-organization and self-regulation. 
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then be spurred and artificially inflated by the boom in the asset part of the financial sector, 
which is triggered by the greed and short-term focus of the financial investors. 39 
It is this finance-based overheating that can topple the whole economy into a severe crisis. 
This will always happen when we have a situation where the market is full of the fear of infla-
tion and where the monetary policy is quickly shifted from an expansion to a contraction 
strategy. Just as we can see in the examples of Japan and the USA, this will lead in most cases 
to a panicking reaction of private investors in the financial markets. They suddenly see their 
return opportunities going down the drain and try to save all they can. Financial bubbles that 
had been built up in the time leading to this point will burst and in its wake will tear down the 
industrial part of the economy. The more important and interconnected an economy is in the 
global economic sphere, the more global and dramatic the consequences and crises will ap-
pear. 
The only sensible path for a future-integrated, continuous and sustainable development of an 
economy or of an economic system is a political strategy of having monitored, moderate 
overall growth with a corresponding rate of development. Only then can all structures, both in 
the real and the financial sectors, advance within the Neo- Schumpeterian Corridor in a 
“healthy”, co-evolutionary way. So it is the government and the central banks that bear the 
responsibility to generate an almost natural balancing between “Fast” and “Slow”, between 
“Dynamic” and “Static”, between “New” and “Old”. The fast growing industries must have 
the possibility to expand without risking having their dynamics devitalized by the more slug-
gish sectors. On the other hand, the latter are supposed to form a natural brake that prevent the 
development of an excessive dynamic both in the industrial and in the financial sector. It is 
the responsibility of the public sector to provide for a framework which is designed in a way 
that both hardships in the present -  such as can arise in regular cyclical recessions – can be 
shouldered and that successful developments in the future are stimulated. An economic sys-
tem can achieve such a secure long-term strategy which minimizes the risks of a boom as well 
as those of a drastic crisis exclusively if it moves within the Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor, if 
possible at its upper end.40  
The idea of such a corridor presupposes that the political sphere can actively decide on the 
framework and take the appropriate measures that can effectively and timely tame and domi-
                                                 
39Hyman Minsky, one of Schumpeter’s students, described such a situation more then 40 years ago very 
accurately. He also thought through in a visionary way the financial consequences and dimensions of 
Schumpeter’s theory of business cycle in the real economy. See for example Minsky (1990). 
40 This idea is not in line with Schumpeter, who included the whole scope of a business cycle, both the boom and 
the crisis, into his model and considered the two extremes a fundamental prerequisite for a “healthy” develop-
ment process of a capitalistic economy. 
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nate those forces in a capitalistic system which continuously try to go through the roof and 
risk exiting the corridor towards an excessive growth path. On the other hand, politicians have 
to make sure that an economy will not fall out of the corridor, and that it will not have to cope 
with economic stagnation. Probably the greatest challenge for academia and politics in the 
next years will be to bring this Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor to life by providing the economic 
and political content of implementing the right strategy. 
As substantial as this challenge may be, there are a few rough and avoidable mistakes in poli-
tics which we can already point to today. The political framework should by all means not be 
limited to singular, not deeply thought through, reactive measures such as are discussed right 
now in Europe and worldwide for the financial sector, such as transparency, surveillance, con-
trol or nationalization in the banking sector. The focus should be much more on the dynamic 
overall performance of a modern, capitalistic economy which is on the brink of transforming 
from an industrial into a knowledge society. This evolution is driven by the three most impor-
tant columns of its economic and social regime, which are the sectors of the real economy, the 
financial sector and the public sector. All three have to serve the future design of society and 
economy and assume a corresponding role.41 In such a concept, the task of the real economy 
will be to foster at all times the knowledge-oriented progress and the resulting wealth of a 
country or a region. To accomplish this task, it needs certain freedoms and the active support 
of the government, for example, through a growth and progress oriented tax system on the 
revenue side of the public budget or investments in education and research on its expenditure 
side.42 
The financial economy has an even closer, almost symbiotic relationship with the real econo-
my. Its task is not – as it just happened – a short-term decoupling from the real economy 
spurred by speculation, but quite the opposite, the medium- and long-term oriented sustaina-
ble financial accompaniment and encouragement of innovative and successful companies and 
sectors. 
The governmental and political responsibility lies, as we just mentioned, in the monitoring of 
the future-oriented, long-term symbiosis of the real and the financial economies as well as 
their co-evolutionary development. This includes the task of overcoming a period of stagna-
tion or recession as quickly as possible. We do not need to point out specially, that this is an 
                                                 
41 In a different paper, we have introduced the term „Comprehensive Neo-Schumpeterian” approach in this con-
text. Cf. Hanusch and Pyka (2007a). 
42 The propositions that the President of the Commission of the EU, Barroso, presented after the EU summit on 
26th November 2008 follow a similar logic. They aim especially at developing Europe towards a knowledge 
society by increasing investments in research and education, as was outlined in the Lisbon Agenda in 2000. Cf. 
Barroso (2008). 
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extremely complex and difficult political challenge concerning the instruments to be used. In 
the upper part of the corridor, politicians have to watch out for signals and possible develop-
ments included in the supply-oriented Schumpeterian theory which can be systematically ana-
lyzed and cured in that context. In the lower part, the demand-oriented Keynesian theory and 
policy certainly have a higher value, especially when it comes to alleviating and curing the 
deflationary consequences of serious crises in their intensity in a short- and medium-term 
perspective. Schumpeter and his theoretical work offer in that respect the first part of a 
“boom-bust”-story, which concerns the core explanation of capitalistic development processes 
in the real economy. Keynes and his politico-economic instruments focus more on the subse-
quent part, which has to deal with the financial repercussions concerning the demand for in-
vestment and consumption. Therefore, it should only be implemented at the end of such a 
“boom-bust”-cycle, when it is all about hoisting the broken economy back into the corridor 
and balancing and animating the appearing demand deficits through stimulating, debt-
financed fiscal measures. This therapy can take the edge off the sickness of a market economy 
in very grave and delicate situations, and if not heal, at least bring some short-term, temporary 
relief and improvement. 
 
Concluding remarks 
From the four postulates, we can address the interdependencies between the financial sector, 
the real sector and the public sector as well as the co-evolutionary development path that ex-
ists between the three sectors, which are linked together in a non-deterministic way and which 
cannot be separated from each other. This requires a holistic and future-oriented problem-
solving strategy,43 and certainly does not include ad-hoc-measures which are solely short-
termed and unilaterally designed and which try to single out a certain field within the overall 
framework of an economy in a positive or negative way, resulting in the potential destruction 
of the evolutionary structure. The responsible bodies should rather take care to find the ap-
propriate mix between Schumpeter and Keynes.44 In that sense, we endorse, on the one hand, 
a policy of long-term oriented promotion of education, research, innovation, technology, en-
trepreneurship, and a revitalized readiness to assume risks; all of which may have been im-
paired by an ongoing crisis. Those elements are today, just as they will be tomorrow, the deci-
sive factors for real success of an economic system. On the other hand, we approve of tempo-
rary, short-termed and quickly effective fiscal measures to boost demand in times of deflatio-
                                                 
43 cf. Hanusch and Pyka (2007c). 
44 cf. Bertocco (2007). 
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nary tendencies. Since the current financial crisis has arisen in a way comparable to recent 
crises, both the scientific and the political world should be able to learn from the past devel-
opments and be up to developing efficient, problem-solving strategies for the present situa-
tion. Evolutionary or Neo-Schumpeterian Economics offer in this respect an approach which 
stands out from other concepts due to its ability to offer a holistic view of the capitalistic mar-
ket system in which we can recognize and analyze the truly relevant factors and elements for 
growth and development. This is true for the full cycle of an economy, from the rapid success 
to the decline and the crisis of a capitalistic system. For it is between those two extremes that 
the development process of economies in a capitalistic environment undulates if it is allowed 
to unroll in an uncontrolled way. Following this analysis, the main problem of an innovative, 
modern and successful market economy as well as the most prominent task for the govern-
ment and economic policymakers is to recognize threats which accompany an extraordinary 
success in a timely manner in order to apply accurately-timed effective cures. If economic 
policy manages to accomplish this supply oriented part in a satisfying manner, they do not 
need to resort to Keynes and his demand oriented set of instruments. Keynes’ theory is only 
relevant when the capitalistic system has fallen out of its own success into a self-inflicted, 
politically unrecognized and therefore not countered crisis. 
Everybody who wants to attain a sustainable and stable development of the capitalistic sys-
tem, which represents after all the most successful economic order which humankind has ever 
devised, should always be aware of the ambivalence that is characteristic for its development 
opportunities. As we have argued, those opportunities do not materialize in a linear and ba-
lancing way but oscillate between extreme ups and downs if the driving forces that stand be-
hind the system are left to adjust freely. Once this basic conclusion is understood, we are 
ready and prepared to think about new measures and add them to the political debate, which 
in fact may not be capable of bringing a capitalistic economy into a neoclassical equilibrium 
but which may be vital to help it live and prosper in a Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor. 
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